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ABSTRACT 
The present study attempted to replicate and extend understandings of differences in 
the metacognitive experiences of solving insight and well-defined problems. Insight 
often occurs with a sudden ' Aha!' reaction compared to the more continuous 
progress typical for well-defined problems. Thirty-two adults completed a within-
subjects computer-based problem solving task involving sets of 8 insight and well-
defined problems, while providing predictions, feeling-of-warmth monitoring, and 
evaluations of performance. A sub-sample completed a Problem Solving Inventory 
(PSI) to compare global and context-specific beliefs of ability. Predictions 
overestimated performance in both sets, but more so for insight than for well-defined 
problems. However, correlations between prediction and performance were not 
significant for either set. No consistent difference in monitoring was found; 
incremental patterns dominated insight and well-defined problems equally. 
Averaged evaluations mirrored the overestimation effects of the predictions, 
although distributions of confidence accuracy were similar across sets. However, 
interesting correlations were found between global PSI scores and the specific 
measures, for both problem types. Methodological differences between the present 
and earlier studies may account for the lack of problem set effects. Conceptual issues 
need to be addressed regarding definition of insight and verification of insight 
experiences, particularly if future research is to reconcile metacognitive and 
cognitive aspects of problem solving. 
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PREFACE 
Problems of various kinds permeate most aspects of our everyday activities. 
Hence, problem solving is a fundamental and pervasive cognitive activity (Mayer, 
1992), a necessary component in negotiating our daily lives. Solving these problems 
requires adequate understanding of what the problem situation entails, what steps 
must be taken to solve the problem, and knowledge of what strategies one may use 
to reach the goal of solution, as well as the ability to execute strategies to this end. 
Achievement of a desired solution often requires that one select the most appropriate 
and efficient strategies to fulfill the identified requirements, while regulating one's 
attempts at using these strategies in order to keep track of progress towards the goal, 
and identifying when the solution has been obtained. Furthermore, one 's beliefs 
about problems and problem solving generally, together with both broad and 
context-specific beliefs about one' s own competencies and abilities, may influence 
the course of one 's solution efforts. 
Metacognition may be one system through which personal beliefs and 
selective strategy application have a bearing on the accuracy of problem solving 
performance. Metacognition refers to a person' s thinking about his or her thinking, 
through the higher-order processes of monitoring, regulating, and evaluating of 
ongoing cognitive processes (Flavell, 1978). As with other aspects of thinking, 
metacognition is considered to be a crucial influence in the efficiency and accuracy 
of people's problem solving activity. Theory and research in this area provide 
indications that problem solving processes are indeed facilitated by adequate 
metacognitive skills. While people differ in terms of the complexity and spontaneity 
of their metacognitive thinking, it appears that these skills can be enhanced through 
development and training (Hanley, 1995; Hayes, 1980; Simon, 1980). Therefore, 
metacognitive aspects of problem solving have both psychological and educational 
implications. The concept ofmetacognition is both meaningful and fruitful for our 
understanding of and attention to problem solving abilities. 
The present study examines the relationships of metacognitive beliefs and 
experiences with the performance of problem solving activities. Both 'on-line' and 
'off-line' assessments are used to assess the metacognitive knowledge and 
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experiences that participants have in relation to solving problems. On-line beliefs are 
measured in the form of predictions prior to solution attempts, monitoring during the 
solution process, and evaluations following completions of a problem set. Off-line 
beliefs are measured with the use of a Problem Solving Inventory (PSI) that assesses 
an individual's perceptions of his or her own general problem solving behaviours 
and attitudes. Furthermore, both on- and off-line beliefs are examined in relation to 
two general types of problems: well-defined and insight problems. Well-defined 
problems are typically solved in an incremental, step-by-step fashion towards a 
given goal. Insight problems typically encourage an obvious but incorrect method 
that leads to an impasse, which may be overcome by a sudden 'flash' ofinsight that 
quickly leads to the correct answer. 
The following review examines the relevant literature in problem solving, 
particularly in relation to insight problems, and in metacognition, with attention on 
metacognitive beliefs and experiences in problem solving. Problem solving is 
discussed in terms of the commonly researched well-defined, ill-defined and insight 
problem structures. Insight is defined and discussed in the context of a classic 
problem solving model that relates the stages of preparation, impasse and 
incubation, illumination, and verification. Metacognition is discussed in terms of 
distinctions between knowledge, executive and procedural control, and affective 
experiences. These components are considered important to information processing 
models of problem solving through the metacognitive processes of identification, 
representation, planning, monitoring, and evaluating. Metacognitive representation 
and monitoring may be particularly important for solving insight problems; 
however, while research has demonstrated the positive effects of metacognition on 
well-defined problems, insight research has proven more complicated and 
controversial. Measures of subjective metacognitive experiences may increase our 
understandings of insight processes, although doubts remain as to whether insight 
involves rapid restructuring of knowledge, and whether unconscious or conscious 
processes are important in relation to metacognitive appraisals. These issues are 
debated, before an overview of the present study is presented. 
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INTRODUCTION 
PROBLEM SOLVING 
One needs only to consider briefly his or her daily life to realize the 
petvasive occurrence of problems across time and situation. Problems, differing in 
nature and severity, abound in whatever domains or contexts within which humans 
exist: for example, education, research, work place, home, leisure activities, and 
social relationships. In more demanding cases, problems may tax our abilities to 
handle the cognitive, emotional, and social demands required in our response to a 
situation, necessitating reliance on coping activities (Cassidy, 1999; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1987). In all cases, the existence ofa problem requires adaptation to some 
situation by negotiating obstacles or barriers that block our progress towards some 
goal ; in short, problem solving. 
Problems are distinguished from tasks; "mental demands for which the 
solution methods are known" (Doerner, 1979, cited in Jausovec, 1994) and that are 
executed solely from memory recall. Whether a given situation represents a task or a 
problem depends on the capacities and experience of the person in the situation. 
Most broadly, a problem exists for a person when "he wants something and does not 
know immediately what series ofactions he can perform to get it" (Newell & Simon, 
1972: p 72). Problem solving, then, involves goal-directed thinking aimed at 
overcoming the obstacles that hinder a person 's obtaining of some goal (Davidson & 
Sternberg, 1998). It is closely related to other cognitive activities, such as 
perception, attention, language comprehension, memory, decision-making, creative 
thinking and critical thinking (Swartz & Perkins, 1990). Together, these processes 
help us to engage and negotiate the situations and duties of daily life. 
Conceptualisations of problems and problem solving are numerous 
(Jausovec, 1994). Newell and Simon' s (1972) 'problem space' model is perhaps the 
most formally explicit and generally applicable model of problems and their 
requisite solution processes. In this model, developed from an information-
processing perspective, problem solution involves the interaction of a problem 
solver with a specific task environment. Solving processes are activated by the 
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identification and representation of a problem, followed by the selection and 
application of solution strategies. A person's representation is an internal 'mental 
model' ofthe external situation (Davidson, Deuser, & Sternberg, 1994). Problems 
are represented in terms of some 'problem space', incorporating an initial problem 
state, a desired goal state, operators or methods, and path constraints. The problem 
state is the point where problem solving begins, where one realises what problem 
exists and his or her desire to solve it. The goal state represents the endpoint or 
solution to be reached. Operators are the methods used to change the initial state and 
reach the goal state; path constraints include any rules or conditions that limit the 
operations used. The size of the problem space is determined by the amount of 
information covered in the representation, and hence the number of operations that 
can be applied towards an endpoint. Not all solutions may be considered desirable 
goals, however; search through a problem space may lead to an incorrect solution. 
Effective problem solution requires the application of operators that allow search 
through the problem space such that the size of the space is effectively reduced, until 
only the path to the desired goal remains. A desired solution usually requires either 
modification of the existing representation, or development of a new representation 
altogether. Central to the solving of problems, then, are the representations 
constructed of the situation and the strategies or operations applied to those 
representations. 
1. Well-defined and Ill-defined Problems 
Newell and Simon's (1972) conception of problem space is particularly 
suited to problems that are well-structured. It may be less useful for other types of 
problem. The most common typology of problem structure distinguishes between 
well-defined and ill-defined problems (Gilhooley, 1988; Kitchener, 1983; 
Robertson, 1999). A well-defined problem exists if the elements of problem state, 
goal state, operators, and path constraints are clearly specified; for example, the 
problems in Appendix B are considered to be well-defined in nature. An ill-defined 
problem exists if any or all of these problem elements are vague or unspecified. For 
example, composing a poem, choosing a career or a marriage partner, finding means 
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to limit pollution are common ill-defined problems; a specific goal may not be 
defined, one of several feasible solutions may need to be chosen, or the path to a 
solution may not be easily specifiable. No doubt both problem types exist on a 
continuum, rather than as a strict dichotomy, of structural definition (Greeno, 1978). 
Nevertheless, while most research has focused on well-structured problem solving, it 
is widely acknowledged that most problems of daily life are ill structured in nature 
(Kahney, 1993; Kitchener, 1983; Kitchener & King, 1990). 
The broad distinction between well- and ill-defined problems is not the only, 
nor indeed the most precise, taxonomy of problem types (see Jausovec, 1994 for a 
thorough review). Well-defined problems differ amongst each other in important 
respects, as do ill-defined problems. Therefore, a problem's characterisation may 
differ depending on the taxonomy that is used to classify it. Nevertheless, the well-
defined versus ill-defined division emphasises a significant distinction in the 
classification of problems that is still considered a useful and meaningful distinction 
(Ashman & Conway, 1997; Matlin, 1998; Mayer, 1999; Robertson, 1999; Schraw, 
Dunkle & Bendixen, 1995). 
2. Insight Problem Solving 
'Insight' refers to the sudden realization of a problem solution, often with a 
sudden change in one's understanding of the problem, and often with a 'flash' or a 
sense of surprise that prompts an 'Aha!' response (Davidson, 1995; Dominowski & 
Dallob, 1995; Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b). The concept of insight has gained notoriety 
thanks to anecdotal evidence from biographies of historical figures who reputedly 
made astounding scientific discoveries or artistic creations through sudden insightful 
experiences; for example, Archimedes, Newton, and Darwin (Weisberg, 1986, 1993, 
1995a, 1999). Insight is a particularly interesting form of problem solving to study 
given its purported links with creativity, its alleged role in many great discoveries, 
and because most people have experienced a ' flash' of insight at some point 
(Sternberg & Davidson, 1999). Also, the concept has historically been shrouded in a 
degree of mystery and controversy, given the numerous but difficult-to-verify 
explanations for its occurrence, often citing unconscious processes. 
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Systematic research into insight processes began with Gestalt psychologists 
who related the experience of insight in problem solving to perceptual processes 
involved in observing 'bistable' figures (for example, the Necker cube, the Janov 
duck-rabbit). These figures can be perceived in either of two forms, and perception 
of the figures often involves a sudden switch from one form to the other, with no 
apparent stable transition between the two forms. Gestalt theorists attributed this 
phenomenon to the holistic reorganization of the parts making up the figure, 
bringing meaningful order to the whole perceptual structure. In a similar fashion, 
insight in problem solving is achieved by 'seeing' a problem in a new way, or 
perceiving some coherent underlying structure (Mayer, 1999). Gestalt psychologists 
identified two broad types of problem solving: reproductive and productive (Kohler, 
1969, cited in Dominowski, 1995). Reproductive thinking involves making use of 
previous experience, previously acquired knowledge or procedures in order to solve 
a current problem. The challenge is to identify the right knowledge or procedure to 
draw on. In contrast, productive thinking requires that one go beyond available 
knowledge, such that new procedures or knowledge be generated in order to achieve 
a solution. As Dominowski (1995) notes: 
"Kohler argued that all problem solving concerns awareness of relations and 
that productive problem solving involves awareness of new relations among 
problem components. Understanding of these new relations, according to 
Kohler, is what is meant by insight" (p74). 
Insightful productions are marked both by novelty, producing some idea or 
product that was not previously generated, and by functionality or value, with the 
new product fulfilling some purpose. Thus, insight processes are related to the wider 
domain of creativity and creative thinking, also providing a link between puzzle-
based problems commonly studied in laboratory research and case studies of 
creative achievements with greater historical import. Insights may be novel and 
creative either historically, such as a new scientific discovery or invention that 
revolutionises how people interact the world, or personally, as when someone solves 
a puzzle they've never seen before; in the latter case, while a solution may be new 
for an individual, many other people may have independently produced that same 
solution in the past (Robertson, 1999). 
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Classic Gestalt-based studies, while often lacking methodological rigour, 
often not satisfactorily replicated, and provoking vague explanations for insight, did 
introduce some intriguing concepts that have inspired modem perspectives on 
insight and creativity. These studies have paved the way for more rigorous research, 
extending our understanding of the processes involved. 
The problems used to study insight in psychological research are generally 
defined by three criteria: they can be solved with little specialized knowledge, they 
commonly lead to an impasse in solution progress, and solution is attained suddenly 
with some new reorganization of knowledge accompanied by an 'Aha' experience 
(Dominowski, 1995; Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). Typically, insight 
problems differ from ill-defined problems in that the former have specifiable 
problem states and goal states whereas the latter often do not. However, insight 
problems often do not have readily identified operations with which to reach a 
solution, in contrast to more well-defined problems. The key to solving many insight 
problems is in constructing an appropriate representation, rendering the solution 
obvious. The difficulty lies in the fact that presentation of the problem usually 
encourages an inappropriate representation, hence impeding solution. 
The occurrence of insight has been set into a wider context of problem 
solving processes. Gestalt theories, particularly Wallas' (1926; cited in Robertson, 
1999; Smith, 1995) classic model, propose four elements of insightful problem 
solving: preparation, impasse or incubation, insight or illumination, and verification. 
This model has enjoyed a modem resurgence in popularity, although specific aspects 
have been criticized. While most theorists generally accept that preparation and 
verification are elements of all problem solving, the concepts ofimpasse, incubation 
and illumination have been subject to some controversy. These latter concepts are 
assumed to be the defining processes in solution of insight-like problems. 
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a. Impasse in insight 
Solutions to insight problems are often characterized by a preceding impasse, 
or a period when the solver has no idea or direction of how to proceed. Typically, 
this is attributed either to the prior generation of an inappropriate representation of 
the problem or to an inability to generate potential strategies. The solver may realise 
that existing representations or strategies are not working, but be unable to produce 
any other useful ideas (Weisberg & Alba, 1981 ). Gestalt psychologists have 
demonstrated two factors that appear to promote impasses: mental set and functional 
fixedness. Stereotypy, or "mental set" fixation, refers to getting 'stuck in a rut', or 
the tendency to repeat previous strategies that have already proven to be unhelpful; 
however, one cannot escape the constraining influence of this set in order to try a 
more useful solution path (Davidson et al, 1994). Functional fixedness refers to the 
tendency to perceive and relate to an object only in terms of its usual function, even 
though using that same object for a different function can fulfil the requirements 
needed to solve a problem (Maier, 1931, cited in Ellen, 1982). In both cases, the 
inability to break away from inappropriate assumptions based on past experience can 
lead to impasses in solution attempts. 
Two problem space conceptualisations, with differing implications for 
subsequent solution processes, have been proposed to explain impasses. First, 
impasses are viewed as searching through the wrong problem space or 
representation; solution thus requires generating a new, more appropriate 
representation, through some form of restructuring (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & 
Rhenius, 1999; Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001; Schooler & Melcher, 1995). 
Similarly, lateral thinking has also been construed as the ability to switch from one 
representation to another, rather than continuing to mine the depths of an 
unproductive approach: "Vertical thinking is digging the same hole deeper; lateral 
thinking is trying again elsewhere" (de Bono, 1967: p22). New representations may 
be generated, and impasses overcome, through several empirically supported 
processes including relaxation of constraints (inappropriate assumptions) and 
decomposition of perceptual chunks (Knoblich, et al., 1999), or selective encoding, 
selective comparison, and selective combination of problem elements (Davidson, 
1995; Davidson & Sternberg, 1984; Davidson et al , 1994). 
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Alternatively, impasses may result from employing the appropriate 
representation but not generating the correct strategy needed to navigate through the 
problem space in order to obtain the correct solution; for example, the search space 
may be sufficiently large that the correct path is difficult to find (Weisberg & Alba, 
1981 ). However, the key to finding the correct path is to employ cued memory 
retrieval processes based on past attempts; practice and prior experience are helpful, 
insightful restructuring of existing knowledge is not necessary or helpful. This 
approach does not preclude a sudden solution; rather, even a sudden solution can 
occur without restructuring of the original representation. While the "insight" and 
"incremental" views may both be viable under different circumstances or problems, 
proponents of the incremental memory-search view tend to discredit the former, 
insight position. 
b. Incubation in insight 
Interestingly, researchers have demonstrated that people apparently 
overcome impasses and produce correct solutions following a period of incubation, 
or time taken away from mental work targeted on the problem (Mayer, 1995, 1999; 
Simon, 1966, cited in Robertson, 1999; Smith, 1995). This seems to contradict 
common sense; that is, not thinking about a problem seems to help a person solve it. 
The correct answer may appear as an insight either during this period of incubation 
or shortly after one resumes conscious solution attempts. Again, several explanations 
have been proposed, many focusing on unconscious mechanisms while others 
disavow any unconscious involvement. For example, Wallas (cited in Weisberg, 
1993) implicated the unconscious recombination of old ideas to form new and more 
productive ideas; recent research provides some evidence for similar processes in 
terms of non-conscious spreading activation (Bowers, Farvolden, & Mermigis, 1995; 
Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Ohlsson, 1992) and conscious 
selective combination (Davidson, 1995; Davidson et al, 1994 ). Breaks from a 
problem may allow for the substantial decay of an over-activated but inaccurate 
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representation ( cf mental sets) utilised prior to the break, such that returning to the 
problem allows one to overcome the fixation and develop a new representation that 
leads to solution (Simon, 1966, cited in Robertson, 1999; Smith, 1995). 
Alternatively, terms or features in the problem presentation may implicitly cue non-
conscious concepts in long-term memory related to the correct solution, priming a 
person to encode relevant information when it is experienced; related cues from the 
environment, even if attended to without awareness, may strengthen activation of the 
primed concepts in long-term memory to a degree that the appropriate concepts for 
solution suddenly appear in consciousness (Patalano & Siefert, 1994; Siefert, Meyer, 
Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995; Yaniv & Meyer, 1987). 
In contrast, Weisberg (1986, 1993) argues that many problems solved 
following an impasse are not accompanied by the sudden insight implied by the 
classic interpretation ofincubation. He questions whether, given a solution that is 
generated without suddenness, incubation in the classical sense can be said to occur 
even if a break in progress is undertaken. Weisberg also suggests that in many cases 
of supposedly unconscious incubation people actually engage in sporadic, if brief, 
episodes of conscious "creative worrying" while concentrating on intervening 
activities. Subsequent progress towards a solution would likely be the result of these 
brief periods, even if the periods themselves were forgotten; if so, unconscious 
processes do not need to be implicated. 
As with the experience of impasse, the precise processes occurring during 
periods ofincubation may differ depending on the nature of the problems studied, 
the methods with which they are studied, and the context within which they are 
studied. Any or all of the above interpretations of incubation, or lack thereof, may be 
accurate under particular conditions; the task for researchers would then be to 
systematically determine under what conditions any particular set of processes are 
invoked. Until further research is conducted towards these ends, it would seem 
premature to dismiss out of hand any interpretation based on only selected readings 
of the literature. 
Clearly, impasse, incubation and insight are disputed concepts. As with well-
defined and ill-defined problems, insight-type problems come in many forms, and 
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can be distinguished in important respects (Weisberg, 1995b). Perhaps this is one 
reason why studies using insight-like problems have not yielded completely 
complementary results, and why our understanding of the processes involved in 
insightful solutions are incomplete. A greater appreciation of the processes and 
strategies, both cognitive and metacognitive, involved in the solution of insight and 
well-defined problems may refine our knowledge of the complexity of solution 
processes involved in these problems and in creativity more generally. 
People obviously differ, individually and developmentally, in their abilities 
to solve problems (Brown, 1987; Jausovec, 1994; Kitchener, 1983; Short & 
Weissberg-Benchell, 1989); thus research is targeted towards delineating the factors 
that may help people to improve their problem solving performance. Metacognitive 
processing may be one set of factors that provides an avenue for understanding and 
developing such abilities. 
MET ACOGNITION IN PROBLEM SOLVING 
The systematic study of metacognition is relatively recent (Bruning, Schraw 
& Ronning, 1999), although the philosophical roots of the concept date back much 
further (Yussen, 1985). Interest in metacognition within psychology harks back to 
the use of introspection by the early structuralist psychologists, in attempting to 
understand how a person's conscious awareness of his or her thinking affects those 
very thinking processes (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Contemporary interest arose as a 
reaction against the negative attitudes of the behaviourist and early information-
processing schools towards consciousness (Tulving, 1994). Studying metacognition 
provides a first-person perspective of knowledge awareness, in contrast to the third-
person perspective provided by earlier orientations. Flavell (1971, 1976) is credited 
with establishing metacognition as a research topic in its own right. He considered 
this to be ''the central problem in learning and development" (1976: p231). Early 
literature indicates a primary concern with developmental aspects of self-reflective 
abilities in childhood (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994; Yussen, 1985). Also, research 
focussed largely on memory, as opposed to other cognitive activities. 
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Flavell (1976) did briefly consider metacognitive aspects of problem solving. 
He suggested that children's problem solving is enhanced through the planful 
storage ofinformation considered to be useful for future problem solving, the 
planful maintenance and revising ofinformation for future retrieval, and the planful 
retrieval and systematic searching for relevant information when a problem requires 
solving. Flavell (1976) indicated that children must learn the ' how' (strategies), the 
'where' (internal and external information sources), and the 'when' ofproblem-
relevant information usage. He believed that people could become better problem 
solvers through learning how to improve their abilities to "assemble effective 
problem solving procedures from already available cognitive components" (p233). 
It is apparent in the early literature that little theoretical construction or 
empirical research had been conducted to develop such ideas. Such theory and 
research has subsequently been developed, and important :findings have appeared 
(Bruning et al , 1999). Indeed, the concept has proven of interest and worth in many 
research domains including memory (Bunnell, Baken, & Richards-Ward, 1999; 
Koriat, 1994, 1998; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990), problem solving (Berardi-Coletta, 
Dominowski, Buyer, & Rellinger, 1995; Betsinger, Cross, & Defiore, 1994; 
Davidson et al, 1994; Davidson, 1995; Jausovec, 1994; Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b; 
Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987), perceptual processes (Bowers et al 1990; Carroll, 1993), 
language comprehension and production (Brown, Armbruster, & Baker, 1986; 
Greeno & Riley, 1987; Hacker, 1998; Pereira-Laird, 1996), social cognition 
(Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998; Lories, Dardenne & Yzerbyt, 1998; Mischel, 1998), 
development (Butterfield, Nelson & Peck, 1988; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994; Kuhn, 
Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995; Schneider, 1998), neuropsychology 
(Shimamura, 1994; Shimamura & Squire, 1986), and motor activity (Simon & 
Bjork, 2001 ). Practical fields including education (Mayer, 1998), clinical practice 
(Dixon, Heppner, Burnett, Anderson, & Wood, 1993; Flett & Johnston, 1992; Mayo 
& Tanaka-Matsumi, 1996), and business/organizational practice (Smith, 1998; 
Williams & Yang, 1999) have also incorporated metacognitive perspectives. 
At the most general level, Nelson and Narens (1990) provide a broad model 
for metacognition. They posit the existence of two levels of cognition: a lower 
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'object-level' at which cognitive activity takes place, and a higher 'meta-level' 
which contains a dynamic model of, and controls the activity of, the object-level. 
Two reciprocal types of information flow represent the relationship between these 
levels: 'control' from meta-level, which regulates and modifies the activity of the 
object-level; and 'monitoring' from the object-level, which informs the higher level 
of its activity, and modifies the meta-level model of the lower-level. Primarily, 
Nelson and Narens (1990) have applied this framework to memory processes, from 
acquisition to retrieval. However, this model may also be applicable to problem 
solving, albeit only as a descriptive tool. 
Such definitions of'metacognition' are criticized for their vagueness (Brown 
1987; Paris and Winograd, 1990; Jausovec, 1994, 1999). For example, Brown 
(1987) argues that while the blanket term 'metacognition' encompasses an essential 
concept, it is rather nebulous and glosses over important distinctions. That is, 
metacognition is not one underlying process, but rather a set of processes that may 
differ across task and problem domain. Also, it is often difficult to distinguish 
'cognitive ' from 'metacognitive ' processes (Weinert, I 987). The nature of 
metacognition also provides measurement difficulties (Paris & Winograd, 1990). 
Brown (1987) therefore advocates that, in the interests of"clarity and 
communicative efficiency" (p 106), researchers should focus on the specific 
processes encompassed by the term, and the specific cognitive domains in which it is 
used (memory, communication, etc.). The term is still of value, however, as an 
orientation towards thinking of cognitive awareness and development, performance 
differences, and instruction (Paris & Winograd, 1990; Yussen, 1985). It is rendered 
more useful if efforts are made to delineate the specific processes under 
consideration, and to study these in detail as distinguishable but related processes. 
In delineating more specific processes of metacognition, most theorists have 
distinguished between two major aspects: metacognitive knowledge or beliefs, and 
metacognitive strategies or executive processes (Brown, 1978; Brown et al, 1986; 
Flavell, 1987; Kluwe, 1982, 1987). Metacognitive experiences or feelings have also 
been identified as important (Flavell, 1987; Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe & 
Wiebe, 1987; Davidson, 1995). In addition, more recent theories have included 
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motivational factors, such as interest in task-engagement, desire to succeed, self-
confidence, and performance attributions (see Ashman & Conway, 1997; Mayer, 
1998; Short & Weissberg-Benchell, 1989), and epistemological assumptions 
(Kitchener, 1983; Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995) in a more comprehensive 
account of metacognitive activity. The following discussion outlines theoretical 
contributions to understandings of metacognitive knowledge, executive processes, 
and affective experiences. 
1. Metacognitive Knowledge And Executive Control 
Most common in early models is the distinction between declarative and 
procedural components of metacognition, or between knowledge of cognition and 
regulation of cognition. For example, Brown (1978) distinguishes between 
"knowing what", or knowledge of necessary process or strategy, and "knowing how 
and when" to use an applicable process or strategy. Kluwe (1982) states that the 
central aspects of metacognition are that a person has knowledge of one' s own and 
others ' thinking, and that a person has the ability to control or regulate his or her 
own thinking. Metacognitive self-appraisal has similarly been conceived as 
declarative (what you know), procedural (how you think), and conditional (knowing 
when and why certain knowledge and strategies should be used) (Paris & Winograd, 
1990). The declarative-procedural distinction reflects a common differentiation 
throughout cognitive theory, most notably in theories of memory (Matlin, 1998), but 
its relevance to problem solving is apparent. Furthermore, acknowledging the 
metacognitive components of thinking emphasizes the active and self-directive 
features of cognition. 
a. Metacognitive Knowledge 
Metacognitive knowledge has been defined as knowledge of cognition 
(Brown, 1978), "one 's knowledge concerning one's own cognitive processes and 
products, or anything related to them" (Flavell, 1976: p232), and as ''the acquisition 
of knowledge, the amount of knowledge and the assumptions and opinions about the 
states and activities of the human mind" (Kluwe, 1987: p3 l ). It is clearly a form of 
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declarative knowledge in the form of self-reflective thinking focused on the nature 
and on-going activity of cognitive processes. Flavell (1976, 1978, 1987), for 
example, distinguishes among three central forms of meta-level knowledge of 
cognitive phenomena: person-based knowledge, task-based knowledge, and 
strategy-based knowledge. Person-based knowledge includes understanding one's 
own intra-individual differences in ability across content domains, tasks, and time, 
understanding inter-individual differences in abilities between people within specific 
domains and tasks, as well as knowledge of universal factors in thinking common to 
all people, such as the fallibility of short-term memory or that more difficult tasks 
require greater effort. Task-based knowledge involves an understanding of how 
different activities or situations demand different types of strategies, processing, and 
effort. Strategy-based knowledge involves one's understandings not only of 
particular cognitive strategies that are applicable across different situations, but also 
of metacognitive strategies that monitor and control the use oflower-level cognitive 
strategies. Together with these three forms of knowledge, Flavell (1978) notes that 
sensitivity to knowing when particular forms of knowledge are necessary is an 
additional facet of metacognitive knowledge. 
Kluwe's (1982) model of declarative knowledge explicates the nature of 
metacognitive knowledge in greater detail. According to Kluwe, at least six forms of 
metacognitive knowledge are distinguishable across the three dimensions of domain 
specificity versus generality, cognitive activity versus transformation of activity, and 
generality versus diagnosticity. He contrasts one's cognitive-level domain 
knowledge of specific content areas with metacognitive beliefs and assumptions that 
may be both domain-specific, such as believing that one is good at arithmetic but not 
so good at creative writing, and domain-invariant or constant across context. 
Domain-specific and domain-invariant forms ofmetacognitive knowledge 
incorporate understandings of cognitive states, processes, and activities as well as 
the means to transform those cognitive states and activities. These forms may be 
further divided into general knowledge about the organization of cognitive systems 
and diagnostic knowledge that guides beliefs of own and others' thinking in specific 
situations. For Kluwe, general knowledge represents a wide-based belief system 
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about the nature of thinking processes, while diagnostic knowledge is organized in 
the form of self-schemas that integrate beliefs about one's specific abilities. 
b. Executive Control: Monitoring & Regulation 
Procedural aspects of metacognition have been recognised in terms of 
regulation or executive control, referring to the directed monitoring and guidance of 
ongoing cognitive activity. Kluwe (1982) discusses both cognitive and 
metacognitive aspects of procedural knowledge. At a cognitive level are solution 
processes, the strategies, processes and operations aimed at providing solutions to 
problems. At a metacognitive level are executive processes that monitor ongoing 
cognitive activity and regulate the selection, application, and effects of available 
cognitive strategies. The distinction between monitoring and regulation seems 
particularly important (Nelson & Narens, 1990). Whereas Nelson and Narens (1990) 
conceive monitoring as distinct from control, Kluwe's (1982) model subsumes 
monitoring and regulation together under the rubric of executive control. Monitoring 
of cognition allows for the gathering of knowledge about immediate thought 
processes, while regulation allows for efficient application of those processes 
towards perceived task demands in order to complete some task. Both monitoring 
and regulation are considered processes that provide executive control of thinking. 
Brown (1978) states that essential executive skills in the self-regulation of 
problem solving include prediction of one's own capacity to solve a problem, 
awareness of appropriate heuristic strategies and how these should be applied, 
identification of the problem at hand, planning of potential strategies into a usable 
form, monitoring of the strategies as they are used, and ongoing evaluation ofboth 
the processes and products of problem solving to determine a suitable endpoint of 
one's efforts. Similarly, Kluwe (1982) distinguishes the monitoring activities of 
identification, prediction, checking, and evaluation, from the executive regulation of 
self-motivation and interest, one's resources and their allocation, the intensity of 
effort in the form of duration and persistence, and speed of processing. 
Both metacognitive knowledge and executive control are assumed to be 
related, though distinct, forms of metacognition. Kluwe (1987) suggests that 
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declarative knowledge and executive control processes operate together when a 
person is confronted with a problem solving scenario. For example, one' s 
declarative metacognitive knowledge allows one to recognise a problem situation 
and to encode relevant information about the problem's elements, to provide 
informed executive decisions about appropriate strategies and plans that may 
produce a solution. While it is the knowledge facets that provide problem-relevant 
information for the solver, it is the executive control and regulation functions that 
allow solution processes to proceed. However, knowledge and executive processes 
are logically and empirically distinct. Metacognitive knowledge appears to be 
reasonably stable, consciously statable, and late-developing, while executive 
processes may be more automatic, not consciously statable, context-dependent 
across specific tasks, and not age-dependent (Brown, 1978; Bruning et al , 1999; 
Pereira-Laird, 1996). 
2. Metacognitive Experiences 
Metacognitive experiences have been identified as affective counterparts of 
metacognitive self-appraisal but have received less research attention than the 
knowledge-based or procedural control components (Flavell, 1987; Gick & 
Lockhart, 1995; Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; Yussen, 1985). 
Such experiences, or feelings, are defined as "relatively spontaneous reactions or 
reflections that occur on line ( during the cognitive process) while the cognitive 
enterprise is rolling along" (Yussen, 1985: p256). Whereas metacognitive 
knowledge refers to memory-based conceptions of one' s knowledge, and 
metacognitive control is how people use their knowledge and strategy repertoires, 
metacognitive experiences represent immediate affective and cognitive responses to 
ongoing activity; for example, miscomprehending the nature of a problem, realizing 
that one is frustrated with progress on a problem, or having a sense of surprise at 
suddenly finding a workable solution. 
These on-line feelings can be diagnostic, ifinterpreted correctly, in that they 
can direct the problem solver to aspects of their cognitive activity that require 
greater or lesser attention. There appears to be developmental differences in ability 
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to interpret such experiences, with younger children being less able than older 
children or adults to respond appropriately to their reflective feelings (Flavell, 1987). 
Metacognitive experiences may also be similar to ongoing attributions about the 
causes of ease and difficulty in a problem solving episode (Borkowski, Carr, 
Rellinger, & Pressley, 1990). Gick and Lockhart (1995) suggest that initial affective 
responses to a problem can motivate a person' s decision to ignore or engage in 
problem solving. 
The self-reflective and diagnostic nature of metacognitive feelings may be 
particularly useful in the continuous monitoring of cognitive activities, particularly 
problem solving attempts. For example, feelings of warmth or progress towards a 
goal should guide the direction of a person's subsequent strategies. Feeling that one 
is working in the right direction will allow narrowing of potential solution paths 
down to those deemed most productive; feeling that one is not working in the right 
direction encourages the solver to try a new solution path (Metcalfe, 1986b; Simon, 
Newell, & Shaw, 1979). This obviously requires a measure of self-reflection 
involving explicit, or possibly implicit, appraisal of problem-relevant information. 
However, the affective experiences associated with problem solving may be 
negative (frustration at lack of progress, annoyance at not solving the problem 
earlier) as well a positive (pleasure at finding correct solution) (Gick & Lockhart, 
1995). The affective quality of metacognitive appraisal may be most apparent in the 
solution of insight problems; solution to these problems is often accompanied by a 
sense of suddenness or surprise, resulting in the reputed ' Aha! ' reaction (Metcalfe, 
1986b; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 
1995). The resolution and affective response to insight problems is similar to that 
experienced in 'getting' a joke (Gick & Lockhart, 1995). 
Distinctions between elements of metacognition, particularly metacognitive 
knowledge and executive control, have been central to the confusion surrounding the 
construct of metacognition, and have lead to doubts about the extent to which 
declarative knowledge and procedural control can be related. Some researchers ( e.g. 
Kluwe, 1982, 1987; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Pereira-Laird, 1996) obviously see the 
two forms as interactive components, while others argue that either one or the other 
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form should alone be considered as metacognitive. The prevailing beliefis that a full 
appreciation of metacognition and related behaviour requires consideration of 
knowledge, executive processes, and affective experiences together. 
3. Metacognitive Information Processing In Problem Solving 
Information-processing approaches to metacognition have applied 
metacognitive knowledge and control to various higher-order processes across the 
course of a problem solving episode. Typical progressive metacognitive processes 
include identification, representation, planning, monitoring, and evaluation (Brown, 
1978; Davidson et al, 1994; Flavell, 1978; Kluwe, 1982, 1987); presumably these 
processes are universally applicable across many domains of problem solving. 
a. Identification and problem finding 
Identification of a problem is a critical first step; recognizing that a problem 
exists, and having a desire to rectify the problem, encourages one to engage in 
problem solving activities . All problem solving reputedly requires the solver to 
identify, or encode, the relevant features of the problem, to store this information in 
working memory and long-term memory, and to relate the incoming information to 
existing relevant knowledge structures (Flavell, 1978; Newell & Simon, 1972). 
Identification of a problem requires a certain amount of self-reflection on the 
features of a situation to determine if a problem actually exists; that is, if there are 
obstacles to be overcome in achieving a goal. Many potential problematic or 
improvable situations may go unnoticed if a person cannot identify elements in a 
situation that can be changed. "Problem finding" has recently been identified as an 
important skill in post-formal adult thinking, and has been related to creative 
processes (Dominowski, 1995; Lubart & Sternberg, 199 5; Perkins, 1981 ). People 
who can view existing situations in novel and creative ways can presumably focus 
on otherwise unnoticed but improvable conditions, or find better methods of 
organizing situations to facilitate some new goal (Arlin, 1989; de Bono, 1967). 
Problem identification may be just as conceptually complex as subsequent 
metacognitive phases of problem solving. Sufficient identification of a problem and 
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its features allows for mental representation of the problem, prediction ofimpending 
success, and planning of solution strategies. 
b. Problem representation and solution prediction 
Developing a useful mental representation ofa problem's structure is 
essential to engaging in effective solution processes (Newell and Simon, 1972). 
Many problems may elicit representations automatically, without conscious control 
(Schooler & Melcher, 1995). However, metacognitive control over representation 
construction is possible, and is particularly useful where solution to a problem 
requires a change in representation (e.g. insight problems). 
For example, Davidson and Sternberg's (1984; Davidson, 1995; Davidson et 
al, 1994; Sternberg & Davidson, 1982) three-process model of selective processing, 
a sub-theory of the triarchic theory of intelligence, outlines three metacognitive 
processes that influence the development of problem representations: selective 
encoding, selective combination, and selective comparison. These processes are 
arguably applicable to all problems, though Davidson and Sternberg emphasize the 
relevance to insight problems. Selective encoding involves focusing on that 
information which is deemed most relevant to a correct solution; if a solution is not 
possible, representational change may require selective encoding of problem features 
that were originally non--0bvious. Selective combination involves integration of 
problem relevant information into patterns that facilitate solution; impasses in 
progress may be overcome by combining features in otherwise non-obvious ways. 
Selective comparison requires the solver to compare new problem-relevant 
information with existing knowledge, through analogies and metaphors for example, 
to develop a workable solution; again, non-obvious connections between new and 
old knowledge can facilitate changes in representation that facilitate solution. 
Davidson and Sternberg (1984) note that solving a problem may require any one, or 
a combination, of these processes. Research needs to consider under what conditions 
and with what problems each of these processes are valuable. 
An understanding of the nature ofa problem, acquired once a representation 
has been developed and one's relevant knowledge and competence has been 
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assessed, allows for predictions of imminent solution progress and anticipation of 
the likelihood of success. Such predictive judgements, or feelings-of-knowing 
(FOKs) the answer to some problem, are crucial to the forthcoming course of 
solving attempts: selecting problems that are considered solvable, indicating how 
much time, effort, and persistence should be allocated, and selecting appropriate 
strategies that could lead to solution (Kluwe, 1982; Metcalfe, 1998a; Paris & 
Winograd, 1990). These predictive functions in turn allow for planning of problem 
attempts. 
Interestingly, research across problem solving and other cognitive activities 
(e.g. memory) has demonstrated a pervasive ' cognitive optimism' in people's 
predictive judgements; people generally believe that their performance will be better 
than it actually is (Metcalfe, 1998a). The relation of prediction to performance 
depends on how it is assessed. Schwartz and Metcalfe (1994) distinguish between 
micro-predictive and macro-predictive accuracy. With micro-prediction 
measurement, in absolute terms people tend to perform better on specific tasks that 
they are more confident about solving than on tasks they are less confident about; in 
this sense, people are generally accurate at predictive ranking of tasks in terms of 
relative difficulty. In contrast, macro-prediction refers to comparing the average 
predictions with respect to overall performance; on average, people overestimate the 
probability ofimminent success. Over-prediction appears to be due to the nature of 
the information on which people base their estimates; namely, any relevant 
knowledge that is activated or accessible from memory, regardless of its accuracy 
(Koriat, 1994, 1998; Metcalfe, 1998a). That is, the more partial, even if inaccurate, 
information people can access upon cuing of the problem and its representation the 
higher their predictions tend to be. Unfortunately, the incomplete or inaccurate 
information upon which estimates are based does not actually help problem solution; 
hence failure is often the outcome. 
The implication of overestimation is that it does not seem to support efficient 
problem solving; overestimations of success may lead to less efficient monitoring, 
prompting people to terminate solution attempts before the correct solution has 
actually been found. 
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c. Monitoring and evaluation 
Monitoring and evaluation are closely related higher-order activities, and 
may be difficult to distinguish. Monitoring is obviously a central aspect of 
metacognitive control in most cognitive activities, but has a particularly relevant role 
in the progress of solution activities as they occur, as discussed above. Monitoring 
itself represents one form of evaluation process, that of the ongoing solution process. 
Efficient on-line monitoring and regulation of solution processes may enable greater 
performance, through the generation of more accurate or useful solution products 
(Brown, 1978; Kluwe, 1982, 1987). 
However, evaluation of the products themselves is also important. Once a 
potential or partial solution has been generated, the problem solver needs to evaluate 
the solution to determine ifit indeed meets the requirements of the identified goal; if 
so, solution efforts may be terminated but, if not, the search for a new solution 
begins or is terminated because the solver does not wish to persevere with the 
problem. This latter case indicates why monitoring and evaluation are inseparable, 
because evaluation is ongoing throughout the solution episode until problem-related 
activity is terminated. Davies (2000) demonstrated the effectiveness of ongoing 
evaluation in solving a well-structured problem. Performance on the Tower of Hanoi 
task was enhanced for participants who were required to provide a verbalized or 
non-verbalized evaluation for each successive move, relative to participants who 
provided no evaluations. Additionally, participants providing evaluations were 
disrupted by undertaking a concurrent task while no-evaluation participants 
experienced no disruption from this task. This suggested that the act of ongoing 
progress evaluation enabled participants to develop explicit representations of their 
solution strategies; these representations were open to disruption by increased 
working-memory load. 
Indeed, all of the metacognitive activities identified above may occur in a 
non-linear f01m as the problem solver reflects on their activity; all processes 
presumably occur in an interactive fashion together, and all are necessary if a goal is 
to be obtained. 
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Despite distinctions between knowledge, control, and affective experiences, 
metacognitive activity is assumed to be central to efficient thinking and performance 
across the course of problem solving. Indeed, Brown (1978) considers executive 
functioning to be ' 'the crux of efficient problem solving" (p82). Kluwe (1987) 
suggests that it may be both intra- and inter-individual variations in executive 
control of thinking that account, to a reasonable degree, for performance differences 
and deficits. Research has helped establish the veracity of the hypothesized link 
between metacognition and cognitive performance, but not without controversy. 
Metacognitive processing has proven to be a challenging construct to investigate 
empirically, due to the subjective and higher-order nature of the processes suggested 
by theory. 
Informative empirical findings have accrued through the use of ' think-aloud' 
verbalization techniques, and subjectively-based phenomenological techniques that 
reputedly tap into metacognitive experiences. 
4. Metacognitive Monitoring And Verbalization 
The impetus for verbalization procedures arises from the identified need to 
access a person's flow of conscious thoughts as they engage in a problem, based on 
an assumption that a person ' s immediate thoughts contain higher-level self-
reflective ' inner speech' that can be characterized as metacognitive. Presumably, if 
the researcher can gain access to these higher-level thoughts then he or she can 
observe what metacognitive processes the problem solver is engaged in during the 
immediate moment of solution activity; this may also allow one to observe in what 
ways metacognitive thoughts may regulate concurrent cognitive activity and 
performance (Dominowski, 1998). Verbalization, or ' think-aloud' , procedures 
require participants to speak whatever thoughts come to mind, presumably in 
working memory, as they work on a task. Verbalization methods may be 
retrospective or concurrent; concurrent methods may be either directed or non-
directed (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Retrospective methods require participants to 
describe their prior thoughts shortly after engaging in an activity; concurrent 
methods require on-line reporting of thoughts while engaged in a task. 
24 
Doubts have been cast over the accuracy of verbal procedures to provide a 
window into people's metacognitive reasoning (Jausovec, 1994; 1999). Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) argue that relatively little of our cognitive processes are available to 
awareness; that these self-reports are subjective and unverifiable, and thus 
unreliable; and concurrent verbalization may in fact interfere with the processes 
deemed to be accessed. Jausovec (1994) adds that people can report their cognitions 
only sequentially, whereas many processes operate in parallel and at a rate too fast to 
report; also, the use of different coding protocols across studies encourages 
inconsistent interpretations of verbal data. Research demonstrates that verbalization 
can be an inaccurate record of cognitive and can adversely effect processing in some 
cases (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Schooler et al, 1993); however this depends on the 
type of verbalization instructions employed and the exact nature of what processes 
are under investigation (Brown, 1987; Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1993). Admittedly, 
if people are required to provide on-line verbalizations about otherwise non-
reportable information, the act of verbalization may hinder actual processing 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Wilson & Schooler, 1991 ; Brown, 1987). 
Nevertheless, think-aloud procedures are one of the more common methods 
in metacognitive research. Furthermore, their use is supported both theoretically and 
empirically. For example, Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1993) contend that concurrent 
verbalization of working memory contents has a neutral , non-disruptive effect on 
cognitive processes. Where a person reports information that is not readily 
accessible in verbal form (e.g. some visual information), processing may be neutral 
but slowed-down as recoding into verbal form takes place. In either case, several 
commentators ( e.g. Lieberman, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990) argue that 
introspective self-reports can be informative if considered as an imperfect means of 
self-awareness, and interpreted in this light. Verbalizations do not have to provide 
complete access to underlying processes to be informative and useful. It is the 
motivating and influential nature of these introspective reports with respect to 
cognitive performance that necessitates the need to study such processes. Conscious 
but incomplete thoughts and verbalizations may be particularly informative of 
metacognitive thinking. 
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Berry (1983) and Berardi-Coletta et al (1995) have demonstrated that 
verbalization provides access to metacognitive processes, and that this 
metacognition improves problem solving performance. Berardi-Coletta et al. (1995) 
found similar positive transfer results for process-oriented verbalization groups 
relative to other groups engaged in both the 'Tower of Hanoi' task and the Katona 
card problem. Two process-level groups (either focusing on process-level 
metacognitive (MC) monitoring of solutions or making "If ... Then" (IT) statements) 
performed significantly better than other groups (problem-focused (PF), think-aloud 
(TA) control, silent control) on both practice and transfer trials, in terms of both the 
ratio of excess to minimum required moves, and time to solution. The researchers 
demonstrated that beneficial effects were due not to verbalization per se, but to 
metacognitive processes evoked by the requirement to explain one's thoughts. As 
expected, process-oriented statements were more common (60% of total statements) 
for both process groups, less common (5%) for the TA group, and absent for the PF 
group. These results demonstrated that the shift in processing to a more process-
oriented level did indeed induce participants to engage in more metacognitive 
reasoning, and this improved their performance. Metacognitive statements were not 
made spontaneously in either the TA or PF groups. In a subsequent experiment, 
metacognitive (MC) group members, instructed to think about answers to process-
level questions rather than to verbalise, performed better than a control group 
receiving no additional instructions beyond performing the task. This suggested that 
it is not overt or covert verbalizing per se, but the metacognitive processing induced 
in participants, that aided performance, a finding replicated by Davies (2000). The 
type of thinking encouraged by overt or covert thinking is crucial. 
These studies demonstrate the usefulness of both verbalization and process-
oriented thinking in problem-solving tasks, although the generality of such effects is 
not yet established. For example, the effects of verbalization may depend on the 
nature of the task studied (Dominowski, 1998). The studies cited above used well-
defined problems; verbalization may not be so effective with non-incremental 
problems that require other than well-defined solution methods. Schooler et al 
(1993) have demonstrated that insight problem solving may be subject to the same 
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verbal overshadowing that has been shown with non-reportable processes such as 
facial recognition (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and aesthetic judgements of 
taste (Wilson & Schooler, 1991 ). Using both retrospective and concurrent 
verbalization methods Schooler et al. (1993) found that participants who were 
required to verbalise their thoughts while working on both visual and verbal insight 
problems solved fewer problems than participants not required to verbalize. This 
negative effect of verbalization did not occur for noninsight problems. Schooler et 
al. suggested that solution of the insight problems required processes that were not 
available for conscious inspection; the need to verbalize one's thoughts increases the 
salience of the verbalizable aspects of the stimulus, thus overshadowing the non-
verbalizable aspects. For many insight problems, it may be the non-reportable 
aspects that allow solution of the problem; if these aspects are overshadowed by 
verbalization, solution is impeded. Given that language processes appear to hinder at 
least some insight problem solving, insight processes may operate independently of 
language and are distinguishable in this sense from more well-defined problems. 
Such findings prompt interesting questions about how, or indeed whether, 
insight problem solving can be studied at a metacognitive level. Not only do insight 
processes appear inaccessible through verbalization, but also the act of focusing on 
verbalizable aspects may actually hinder performance. However, insight-related 
metacognitive processes may be meaningfully accessible through the investigation 
of another form of higher-order thinking; namely, metacognitive experiences and 
feelings. 
METACOGNITIVE EXPERIENCE IN INSIGHT 
Given that verbalization techniques often have a negative effect on solution 
of insight-type problems, it is necessary to approach insight-based metacognitions 
from another perspective. Metacognitive experiences or feelings have been 
identified as emotional counterparts ofmetacognitive self-appraisals. Insight is an 
apt area in which to study metacognitive experience given that insight is often 
accompanied by strong affective responses (Gick & Lockhart, 1995). Research has 
found that using metacognitive experience measures is useful for studying insight-
